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ABSTRACT
The paper investigates the changes to the Fund’s bilateral surveillance policy
in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 asking about the factors
that caused the quick and deep shift to a systemic surveillance approach. In
answering this question, the paper argues that the causes of the quick and
deep transformation of IMF surveillance lie in the preceding two decades of
incremental accumulation of knowledge and small transformations in policy
instruments and organizational practices. In identifying the causes of present
policy choices in the lessons drawn from past experience, the paper provides
an example of lagged learning because the lessons drawn from the 1990s
emerging market crises exerted their full impact only as a response to the
global financial crisis. These findings therefore contribute to the literature that
aims at showing the importance of temporality and process sequencing to
explain policy change.
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Introduction
Among the variety of reform proposals triggered by the global financial
crisis of 2007–09, one of the most advocated reforms is the adoption of a
systemic approach to financial supervision, according to which supervisory
authorities should take into account the safety and soundness of the
international financial system as a whole along with that of individual
institutions and countries. In other words, while in the run-up to the crisis,
the dominant approach to financial supervision was largely based on
ensuring the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions in a
single country, by relying on the principles of market discipline and self-
regulation,1 in the aftermath of the crisis, policy-makers and regulators are
converging on a more holistic vision of risk as the primary guiding principle
of financial supervision. Although the debate on macroprudential supervision
is still in its infancy, the new approach differs from its predecessor because
it implies a higher degree of authorities’ intervention and counter-cyclical
policies (for instance, IMF, Bank for International Settlements, and the
Financial Stability Board 2009).
Nowhere is this shift more evident than in workings of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, the Fund was created in 1944 to preside over
the stability of the international financial system. The Fund primarily
discharges this mandate by analyzing each member’s economic policies and
giving advice to the national authorities on how to change them, through the
so-called Article IV surveillance reports. One of the characteristics of the
Fund’s bilateral surveillance is its predominant one-country focus. That is to
say, IMF surveillance is meant to detect the problems in domestic policies
that risk undermining the member’s own domestic stability. Nevertheless, in
the aftermath of the 2007–09 financial crisis, IMF surveillance has started
taking on an explicit multilateral or systemic focus. Specifically, IMF
surveillance has been reformed in order to give the Fund the task of assessing
whether domestic policies have negative implications not only for the
member’s own stability but also for international financial stability.
The transformation of IMF surveillance as a response to the financial
crisis is puzzling under several respects. To start with, the shift to a systemic
oversight approach in IMF surveillance is a profound transformation of the
Fund’s activity as compared to the slow-moving development of IMF
surveillance over the decades.2 For instance, the historical development of
IMF surveillance has been so gradual that the IMF Managing Director has
recently acknowledged that, in the run-up to the global financial crisis,
‘surveillance [had] lagged behind global economic and financial develop-
ments’ (Strauss-Kahn 2010). The change to IMF surveillance is also all the
more puzzling because it began and picked up momentum at a moment
when other major reforms to IMF’s policies were stalling – including the
reform of the Fund’s governance which is expected to increase the repre-
sentation of developing and emerging market countries. Finally, the quick
shift to a systemic oversight approach is also puzzling as compared to the
traditional practice of bilateral surveillance. In particular, shifting to a
systemic surveillance approach requests a demanding organizational effort
from the Fund – i.e. it requires the Fund to develop resources to collect and
pool information on a wide range of potential sources of financial risks. A
systemic approach to financial surveillance also requires the Fund to
develop and operationalize new standards against which to assess domestic
policies. Interestingly, however, in spite of the difficulties associated with the
shift towards systemic surveillance, the IMF has quickly changed its policy
as a response to the latest global financial crisis.
This paper examines and explains this empirical pattern of quick
and abrupt change. In doing so, it contends that the IMF policy shift
cannot be fully grasped by relying on the punctuated equilibrium model of
change that is frequently embedded in conceptualizations of policy change.
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That is to say, the policy change under examination cannot be theorized as
a dramatic reconfiguration, arising from a large-scale shift in exogenous
conditions. Rather, the paper argues and illustrates that the transformation
in the Fund surveillance policy can be explained only with reference to the
preceding two decades of incremental accumulation of knowledge and
small transformations in policy instruments and organizational practices.
Specifically, the lessons drawn from the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997–8
Asian crisis led to a number of small and incremental changes to IMF
surveillance that structured the options available for the next round of
reform in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–09.
Emphasizing the importance of past lessons to present policy choices,
the paper therefore provides a case-study of lagged learning – i.e. a case
where the lessons drawn from experience are not entirely transmitted to the
policy outcomes but are delayed. In the case study under investigation here,
factors related to both the supply and the demand side of the policy-making
slowed down the effects of learning that followed the Mexican and the
Asian crises. On the supply side, the expertise and organizational structure
of policy entrepreneurs – i.e. IMF staff members – prevented the Fund
from developing fully-fledged understandings of the relationship between
financial sector weaknesses and global macroeconomic and financial sta-
bility.3 For instance, the dominant macroeconomic expertise of IMF staff
helps explain why, in spite of the alarm bell sounded by the crises of the
1990s, staff continued to focus on factors such as global imbalances and
disorderly dollar decline as the key risks to global stability, largely failing to
take action to address the risks building up in the financial sector. Further-
more, the hierarchical organization of IMF staff members created the
conditions for marginalizing the views of those experts that were advocating
more radical innovation of financial surveillance, by moving beyond the
micro principles of market discipline and self-regulation (IEO 2011: Annex 4).
On the demand side, the effects of learning were delayed because of the
complex staff-members relationship. The relationship with the Fund’s most
powerful member countries is particularly important here. Indeed, as is
now widely documented (IEO 2011: 21), IMF staff members were ‘overly
influenced by (and sometimes in the awe of) the [advanced countries]
authorities’ reputation and expertise’ therefore feeling uncomfortable
challenging their views on financial regulatory and supervisory issues. As a
result, the Fund embraced the principles that informed supervisory frame-
works such as those of the United States and the UK where light-touch,
microprudential supervision held sway.
Although the effects of learning were delayed, it does not mean that they
were completely eliminated. Rather, the lessons of the 1990s led to a
number of small, but highly consequential, policy changes. Three gradual
changes are particularly important to the present institutional trajectory of
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IMF surveillance. First, the experience of the Mexican and the Asian crisis
contributed to the expansion of IMF knowledge on macro-financial lin-
kages and on financial sector issues at large. Second, based on the
experience of the 1990s crises, the Fund added new policy instruments to its
policy toolkit to monitor member countries’ financial policies and the
global financial system. Finally, by the end of the 1990s, the IMF had
converted its organizational resources – including its staff and departments –
to the task of financial sector surveillance. In short, the changes adopted in
the wake of the Mexican and the Asian crises followed the incremental
pattern of layering and conversion (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2004).
These incremental changes provided the building blocks for the Fund’s
response to the financial crisis of 2007–09. In particular, IMF staff members
drew on the knowledge and the policy instruments developed within the
Fund over the past decades to advance their agenda on the reform of
IMF surveillance. Specifically, they justified their proposal to make the
Fund a systemic supervisor in light of past reforms, which had given
the Fund the theoretical and organizational resources to carry out the new
type of surveillance.
Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. Firstly, the switch to a
systemic oversight approach to financial surveillance is one of the most
important developments in response to the latest financial crisis. It has not
just occurred in relation to IMF surveillance but also in the movement
towards macro-prudential regulation in international supervisory bodies
such as the Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability
Board (see, for instance, Baker 2010). Indeed, one of the lessons drawn from
the crisis has been that micro assessments of risk and financial stability
based on analysis of individual component parts of a financial system are
inadequate, but need to be accompanied by analyses of the aggregate
impact of the interaction between individual component parts. Comparing
these views with the ones that prevailed in regulatory circles in the run-up
to the crisis, the shift towards a systemic approach represents a profound
transformation in the principles governing the financial system. Indeed, the
long-standing approach has been that of a ‘hands-off supervisory style,
where the belief that the private sector ‘‘knows best’’ was permitted to take
hold’ (Kodres and Narain 2010: 4). In other words, there was a strong
presumption that market actors could look after themselves and contribute
to international financial stability: market discipline was widely regarded as
a stabilizing force (Helleiner, Pagliari and Zimmermann 2009). The sys-
temic approach sponsored in the aftermath of the crisis, in contrast, is
staked on the premise that markets require strong regulatory and super-
visory mechanisms to function effectively, thereby opening the door to
public intervention. Given the important differences in the principles
governing the approach to financial surveillance before and after the
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2007–09 crisis, it would be interesting to assess whether such a shift can be
interpreted as a paradigmatic or third-order change (Hall 1993). Never-
theless, this paper takes a more limited perspective by focusing solely on the
shift that has occurred within the IMF. That is to say, the paper does not
investigate the process that led to the emergence of a new systemic
approach to financial surveillance at the global level but solely focuses on
the process through which the new approach has been endorsed in the
Fund’s surveillance.
Secondly, some clarification is needed with regard to the type of policy
analysed in this paper, that is to say, the policy of an international orga-
nization (IO) such as the IMF. Indeed, scholarship on policy studies has
somehow neglected the policies of IOs as a research object. Rather, within
the field of political science, scholars of international relations (IR) and
international political economy (IPE) have traditionally developed the study
of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin and Simmons 1998). This
paper nonetheless builds on the assumption that the activities of the IMF,
like those of most international organizations, can well be conceived of as
public policies. Indeed, similarly to what domestic policies do, IMF policies
are meant to respond to societal problems and promote public debate
around an issue (Newton and van Deth 2005: 263). Furthermore, in terms
of the process through which they are adopted, IMF policies go through the
common policy-cycle, ranging from the stage of agenda-setting to the one
of decision and implementation during which a variety of institutional
procedures and actors are at play. In particular, the IMF’s policy-making
process is characterized by the interaction of member countries’ repre-
sentatives sitting in the IMF Executive Board, which is the main policy-
making body, and IMF staff members, who prepare the policy proposals
and have the responsibility to implement policy decisions.4
Studying IMF policies differs significantly from studying domestic
policy-making. In considering and drafting policies, IMF state representa-
tives and IMF staff do not face the issue of re-election. Nevertheless, the
IMF still confronts an issue of legitimacy conceived of as support that makes
it accountable to its stakeholders (Seabrooke 2007). Furthermore, studying
IMF policies also requires taking into consideration the interaction among
the multiple levels where policy is debated and adopted, including the
domestic and the supranational level. In light of the internationalization
and Europeanization pressures that often influence domestic policy, how-
ever, studying the interaction among multiple levels is not a novelty for the
literature of policy studies. Hence, the key point here is that it is possible to
analyse IMF surveillance in a similar manner as most domestic and EU
policies are studied. That is to say, the concepts and tools that are com-
monly applied to the study of public policies can well be applied to the
study of the workings of the IMF.
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The paper develops the argument in three steps. First, the paper reviews
alternative explanations for the quick and profound change in IMF sur-
veillance and clarifies the theoretical argument that will be tested in the
empirical analysis. Second, the paper describes the key features of the Fund’s
bilateral surveillance and the main reforms introduced in the aftermath of the
latest financial crisis. Finally, drawing from IMF archival documents and
internal reviews, the paper shows how the process of learning in the
aftermath of the Mexican and the Asian crisis and its lagged effects created
the necessary preconditions to the shift to a systemic approach in IMF
surveillance. The last section concludes by reflecting on the empirical
findings.
1. The Implications of Lagged Learning
As has been noted, studies on policy change have advanced to the point
where there is a sort of agreement upon a general basic pattern of policy
dynamics (Howlett 2009). This pattern reproduces homeostatic models in
which exogenous shocks undermine institutionally-entrenched policy
equilibria determining a punctuated equilibrium dynamics (Cashore and
Howlett 2007).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) set forth the punctuated equilibrium
thesis to explain both policy stability and rapid and radical policy change.
Two assumptions guided their analysis. The first is that governments cannot
attend all issues simultaneously, hence, governmental priorities change over
time. The second is that existing institutions and, in particular, existing policy
subsystems prevent and constrain policy change. In other words, institutional
frictions characterize policy-making. Under these conditions, political systems
drift incrementally most of the time only to be roused to major action when
collective attention is galvanized around an issue. That is to say, dramatic
policy shifts are generally associated with heightened governmental attention
around an issue or increased attention within a policy-making venue that had
previously not been involved. ‘As pressure for change builds up, it may be
resisted successfully for a time. But if pressures are sufficient, they may lead
to a massive intervention by previously uninvolved political actors and
governmental institutions’ (True et al. 1999: 101).
At first sight, this perspective appeals as it seems to capture the policy
dynamics of the case under investigation. Indeed, the timing of the change
in IMF surveillance certainly suggests the existence of a correlation between
the politicisation of the debate on financial surveillance and the outcome of
IMF reform. Indeed, the crisis, which was characterized by a widespread
contagion from country to country and by the transmission of shocks from
the financial sector to the real economy, vividly showed the implications of
an ill-devised financial supervision. What was previously a technical affair
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for financial supervisors and international technical bodies quickly became
a public concern, catalyzing both governments’ and public opinion’s
attention especially in the most advanced economies.
Although the punctuated equilibrium model brings to the surface
important factors that help explain changes to the Fund’s surveillance policy
over time, the case under investigation presents serious empirical and
theoretical anomalies. The punctuated equilibrium model cannot fully
explain the rapidity with which member countries converged on the proposal
to change IMF bilateral surveillance into a systemic one. Indeed, assessing
domestic policies from a multilateral perspective is a complex change both
technically and politically. On the one hand, adopting a systemic surveillance
approach presents a number of technical and operational difficulties.
In particular, systemic surveillance is an activity that requires the existence
of appropriate analytical tools and organizational resources to collect and
analyse financial data. In this connection, systemic surveillance also pre-
supposes the existence of member countries’ willingness to cooperate with the
Fund by disclosing data related to their domestic financial systems and
institutions. On the other hand, whereas under Article IV of the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement members are not required to change their domestic
policies in circumstances where they do not undermine domestic stability,
irrespective of their international effects; under the new systemic surveillance
the IMF can request countries to change domestic policies because of con-
siderations not of domestic but international well-being. In light of the
complexities associated with the decision to adopt a systemic approach to
surveillance, an explanation that emphasizes the role played by external
shocks and governmental attention has difficulty explaining the process
through which significant transformations quickly materialize.
Building on these observations, the paper argues that the latest trans-
formation in the Fund’s surveillance, entailing a quick and dramatic shift
from one-country to systemic assessment of risk, did not follow a punc-
tuated equilibrium pattern. Rather, the transformation of IMF surveillance
policy is more the result of preceding events than an independent obser-
vation. Certainly, the 2007–09 financial shock with the attendant peak of
public and government attention are important factors in explaining the
change in the Fund’s policy. However, the impact of these factors cannot be
fully appreciated without putting them into the context of the decade of
learning and reform that preceded the latest financial crisis.
As Hugh Heclo (1974) has powerfully argued, policy-making is not solely
‘powering’ but also a form of collective ‘puzzlement’ on society’s behalf.
This is particularly evident in the IMF where the process of finding solu-
tions to economic puzzles stands at the core of the mandate of the orga-
nization. Two main collective actors are involved in the process: the staff
and the Executive Board.
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The staff of the IMF is a textbook example of well-developed and
autonomous international bureaucracy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Its
members, who are primarily recruited from Anglo-American universities,
include almost exclusively PhD economists with a macroeconomics
expertise (Momani 2005b; also Chwieroth 2010). The technical and spe-
cialized background of its staff make the IMF well-placed to act as a
research organization, as attested by the number of publications that the
Fund regularly produces. The common educational background, combined
with the hierarchical organization of IMF staff members, whose work is
organized in few organizational levels within well-defined departments
(Clark 1996: 175), also contribute to the development of a cohesive voice on
most of the issues relevant to the Fund’s activity. Staff examine a variety of
economic problems from inflation and consumption patterns to financial
volatility, review existing literature on the topics of interest, and assess the
viability of existing theoretical assumptions against historical experience.
This process is often summarized in the staff memoranda (SM) that the
Managing Director, the head of the staff, transmits to the Executive Board
as part of the preparatory work to its meetings. Staff memoranda are
particularly important to the policy-making process. Indeed, they frame the
problem at stake and contain a number of policy proposals for its solution.
The Executive Board is the Fund’s main decision-making body because
it conducts the day-to-day operation of the Fund. It is ‘in continuous ses-
sion’, that is, it meets as often as the business at hand requires.5 The Board
discusses and decides on virtually all aspects of the Fund’s activity from
financial assistance programs to administrative and budgetary matters. In
the area of surveillance, the Board’s main responsibilities include the dis-
cussion of Article IV reports and of the principles that guide the staff’s
surveillance work. Although the IMF is a quasi-universal organization, with
a membership of 187 countries, the Board is made up by 24 Directors.
Specifically, whereas some countries have their own representative (China,
France, Germany, Japan, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, UK, US), the other
members are organized in constituencies (Woods and Lombardi 2006). On
top of the unequal representation, voting rights are primarily allocated by
economic size (Woods 2000). As a result, the United States, in particular,
and the most economically advanced countries, in general, have long
enjoyed a veto power in the organization.6 Nevertheless, note should be
taken that, in spite of the weighted voting system, the Executive Board
decides almost exclusively by consensus, which, according to the Rule C-10
of the IMF’s Bylaws, entails that ‘the Chairman shall ordinarily ascertain
the sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote’.7 Of course, the consensus
rule does not eliminate the effects of the weighted voting system – in order
to ascertain the consensus, the Managing Director has to assess whether a
decision is supported by Executive Directors having sufficient votes to carry
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the question if a vote were taken. Nevertheless, the consensus rule is con-
ceived as an instrument that facilitates large coalition-building within the
Fund’s heterogeneous membership (Van Houtven 2002).
The macroeconomic background of IMF staff members and the pecu-
liarities of the Board composition help explain the delayed effects of the
learning process that followed the Mexican and the Asian financial crises. As
anticipated in the Introduction, although the two crises showcased the risks
of financial sector weaknesses to global stability and well-being, the staff’s
macroeconomic and hierarchical culture constrained the supply of new
policy ideas on how to improve financial supervision. That is to say, the staff
continued praising the virtues of the principles of market discipline and self-
regulation (IEO 2011). This tendency was reinforced by the lack of demand on
the part of the Executive Board. Being dominated by countries with light-
touch supervisory systems, the Board provided no incentive for the staff to
push through radical policy ideas to reform IMF surveillance. The IMF’s
ability to correct its surveillance weaknesses on the basis of experience was
thereby hindered by the staff’s deferential attitude towards the supervisory
preferences of the US, UK, and other advanced countries authorities (IEO
2001: 21). As a result, the lessons drawn from the 1990s crises were translated
only in small changes to IMF surveillance. Rather than a significant trans-
formation of existing instruments and practices, the Fund limited its reforms
to the expansion of its research activity on financial sector issues, the addition
of new policy instruments to its surveillance toolkit, and the conversion of its
organizational resources to the task of financial sector monitoring.
Although small and incremental, the influence of the changes adopted
as a response to the 1990s crises should not be underestimated. Indeed,
‘choices in one period not only limit future options’ but also ‘structure
available options’ in the future (Haydu 1998: 353). In other words, past
solutions provide actors with the building blocks for coping with future
problems and challenges – as the findings of the case under investigation
suggest. Indeed, in the wake of the global financial crisis, IMF staff mem-
bers built on previous transformations to sponsor the role of the Fund as a
systemic supervisor and to forge a supportive coalition among member
countries. Specifically, when the global financial crisis brought to the surface
the weaknesses of microprudential supervision, IMF staff members drew on
the availability of theoretical and organizational resources developed after the
1990s crises to make their case for redressing IMF surveillance towards a
systemic approach. Furthermore, these policy entrepreneurs capitalized on
pre-formed political support, nurtured in previous rounds of reforms, to push
quickly the issue of systemic surveillance into the decision-makers’ political
agenda. In what follows, I am thereby going to provide the empirical evidence
related to the impact of lagged learning on the 2009–10 reform to IMF
surveillance.
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2. The IMF and Bilateral Surveillance: From a One-country Focus
to a Systemic Approach
As the IMF website explains, when a country joins the IMF, it agrees to
subject its economic and financial policies to the scrutiny of the organization.
‘The IMF’s regular monitoring of economies and associated provision of
policy advice is intended to identify weaknesses that are causing or could lead
to financial or economic instability. This process is known as surveillance.’8
In IMF terminology, it is customary to distinguish between bilateral and
multilateral surveillance to indicate the two broad categories of IMF sur-
veillance activity (see, for instance, IEO 2006). Whereas bilateral surveillance
refers to the IMF’s oversight activity over the policies of individual countries,
multilateral surveillance refers to the analysis of global economic and market
developments conducted in the Fund’s flagship publications – i.e. the World
Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report
(GFSR). For the purposes of this paper, in the next sections, surveillance refers
to the bilateral type although, as explained at greater length below, one of the
implications of the recent change to the Fund’s surveillance is that of blurring
the line between bilateral and multilateral surveillance.
As far as concerns bilateral surveillance, the Fund discharges this activity
through periodic consultations with all member countries as requested by
Article IV of its Articles of Agreement. Bilateral surveillance is a regular
activity: it usually takes place on an annual basis when a team of IMF
economists visits a country to assess economic and financial developments
and discuss the country’s economic and financial policies with national
authorities. Bilateral surveillance is also mandatory: members are required
to consult with the Fund when requested, and to provide the Fund with the
information it may require for this purpose. Furthermore, members assume
an obligation to adjust their policies in circumstances where they under-
mine the member’s own domestic stability. That is to say, surveillance
primarily has a one-country focus, assessing the implications of each
country’s policies for its economic and financial stability. Accordingly, ‘spill-
overs from members’ domestic policies in these circumstances cannot be the
primary subject of bilateral surveillance’ (IMF 2010: 2).
Although today’s surveillance covers virtually all aspects of member
countries’ economic and financial choices, the original core of the Fund
surveillance is macroeconomics. That is to say, the IMF has traditionally
analysed and provided advice on issues such as the choice of the exchange
rate and the consistency between the regime of fiscal and monetary policy.
In contrast, financial sector issues were not properly incorporated in sur-
veillance reports in a reflection of the conditions that existed at the time of
the Fund’s creation in 1944, when the international economic system was
organized around the pillars of fixed exchange rates and liberal trade but
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also of controls on capital flows. The macroeconomic core of IMF sur-
veillance also reflects the composition of its staff, whose members are largely
recruited from the macroeconomics profession (Momani 2005a).
Starting in the early 1990s, however, the scope of IMF surveillance has
been significantly expanded so as to include financial sector issues. That is
to say, member countries’ policies meant to regulate financial market actors
and products, were inserted in the analyses conducted by IMF staff
members. Several factors contributed to the changes in IMF surveillance
including the growing integration of global financial markets and the
attendant recognition of the risks that such integration entails as exempli-
fied in the financial crises of the 1990s. In particular, the crises provided the
experience for the IMF to learn about the implications of macro-financial-
linkages, that is, the two-way relationship between the conditions of the
financial sector and macroeconomic stability.
The 2007–09 financial crisis has once again sparked an intense debate on
the reform of IMF surveillance to minimize the likelihood of future crises (IMF
2009b). These considerations culminated in a number of significant changes
to the Fund’s surveillance approach. For instance, in the immediate aftermath
of Lehman Brothers collapse, member countries sitting in the IMF Board issued
the Statement on Surveillance Priorities (SSP) that provides operational gui-
dance to IMF staff on the conduct of bilateral surveillance (IMF 2008b).
Specifically, the SSP, which were released in October 2008, put the emphasis
on external stability as a guiding principle of IMF surveillance. For instance,
IMF staff has been mandated to improve analysis of financial stability, and
deepen the understanding of the real-financial markets linkage. Furthermore,
and most important to the purpose this study, in October 2009, member
countries mandated that Fund surveillance has to analyze the outward spill-
overs of domestic financial policies (IMF 2009a). In this connection, IMF staff
members are also discussing the political feasibility of adopting a Multilateral
Surveillance Decision to clarify the scope and modalities of systematic surveil-
lance. IMF staff members are also proposing to test a new type of surveillance
reports – i.e. spill-over reports – for a number of systematically-important
countries, including the United States, China, Japan, the Euro Area and the
UK (IMF 2010). In what follows, I attempt to gauge how much of this rapid
and radical shift towards systemic supervision can be attributed to the cumu-
lative effects of previous policy choices.
3. Explaining the Shift to Systemic Supervision
3.1. The first steps: Learning from the 1990s crises
Although the Fund carries out the surveillance task since the time of its
creation, its systematic involvement in financial sector surveillance is relatively
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new because it can be traced back to the 1994 Mexican and 1997–98 Asian
financial crises (Gola and Spadafora 2009: 3). Both crises offered a con-
spicuous example of the implications of weak financial systems and of the
speed with which financial vulnerabilities spread across the globe.9 In the
Mexican case, although the crisis started as a typical macroeconomic crisis,
triggered by growing budget deficits and rising inflation, the crisis intensi-
fied because of the fragility of the domestic banking sector and because
investors reacted by withdrawing from emerging markets funds. That is to
say, the events in Mexico in December 1994 prompted a broad sell-off of
developing countries securities. If Mexico had rung an alarm bell on the
destabilizing effects of shifts in market sentiment, Asia was a dramatic
confirmation-test. Countries that right up to the crisis had received the
largest share of capital inflows among developing countries experienced
capital reversals of unprecedented scale. Financial sector weakness played a
key role in the crisis. In particular, substantial foreign borrowing by the
private sector and a weak and over-exposed banking system significantly
contributed to the severity of the Asian crisis and its contagion.10
The experience of the crises sparked an intense in-house reflection
within the IMF – also because the Fund’s failure to identify the risks coming
from the domestic financial sector in both the Mexican and the Asian crisis
laid bare the need to reform its surveillance (Moschella 2010: 81–4, 125–6).
Three main lessons were drawn from the experience of the crises, as evi-
denced in the findings of the main reports that assessed the performance of
the Fund’s surveillance activity (IMF 1997, 1998, 1999). To start with, it
became clear that the Fund needed to develop its knowledge on financial
sector issues and their interaction with the real economy. For instance, in
the aftermath of the Mexican and the Asian crises, the internal reviews on
IMF surveillance emphasised that Fund staff had not sufficiently focused on
financial sector developments, including developments in the banking and
financial sector (IMF 1997: 20). Secondly, an important lesson from the
crises was that the Fund needed new instruments to conduct surveillance.
Indeed, the shortcomings in the oversight activity of the Fund were
attributed to the fact that Fund surveillance had been traditionally mostly
concerned about macroeconomic policy mix, with the result that ‘Fund
missions were sometimes not fully aware of the scale ofy financial sector
problems’ (IMF 1998: 3). Finally, the crisis revealed the weaknesses in IMF
staff’s organizational and analytical skills. That is to say, IMF staff members
were regarded as not having appropriate financial training, being over-
whelmingly recruited from the macroeconomics profession.
Building on these lessons, the IMF started a process of reform of its
surveillance. Interestingly, however, the lessons drawn from the crises did
not bring about radical transformations primarily because the staff’s
macroeconomic culture significantly hindered the embrace of financial
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sector surveillance (Moschella 2012). Combined with the general satisfaction
with existing microprudential surveillance in most advanced economies,11 the
1990s reform process was thereby characterized by a small and incremental
pattern of change: new knowledge and instruments were added to the existing
surveillance toolkit and human resources were redirected to new goals.
To start with, as a response to the crises of the 1990s, the Fund started
developing knowledge on financial sector issues and their implications for
domestic and international stability.12 This has been done in two steps.
First, IMF research showed that the potential connection between financial
sector policies and financial crises identifying the major sources of risks
(Gola and Spadafora 2009: 10–2). Second, internal studies started con-
necting financial sector surveillance with a systemic focus. As one of the
internal reviews prepared by IMF staff put it, ‘systemically important
countries include ‘both countries whose capital markets intermediate the
bulk of global financial transactions, and emerging countries whose
financial system have the potential to cause, or be subject to, undue vola-
tility in cross-border flows and financial system contagion’ (IMF 2000: 29).
Next to the development of the analytical framework on what systemic
surveillance entails, the lessons drawn from the 1990s crises also contributed to
the development of a new set of instruments relevant to the systemic sur-
veillance exercise. Specifically, two new instruments were created for the
analysis of domestic and global financial systems – i.e. the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP) and the Global Financial Stability Report
(GFSR). The FSAP was launched in May 1999 as an add-on to the Article IV
surveillance reports; the Program was conceived as an instrument through
which to identify financial sector vulnerabilities across IMF membership. In
particular, similarly to Article IV reports, the reports prepared under the
framework of the FSAP aim at monitoring the soundness of members’ poli-
cies. In contrast to Article IV reports, however, the focus of the FSAP is solely
on the financial system. The GFSR, in turn, was launched in March 2002 in
order to improve the Fund’s capacity to understand the dynamics of global
financial markets. Specifically, the GFSR is a biannual publication that
complements the Fund’s flagship publication – i.e. the World Economic
Outlook – by focusing on ‘current market conditions, highlighting systemic
issues that could pose a risk to financial stability’.13
Over the 1990s, important changes were also implemented in the
organizational structure of the IMF. In particular, a number of reforms
contributed to converting IMF staff expertise towards financial surveillance.
For instance, in April 2002 the Board approved a measure according to
which Article IV mission teams, whose members usually come from area
departments,14 would have been reinforced by deploying staff coming from
financial sector departments such as the Monetary and Exchange Affairs
Department (MFD) or the International Capital Market Department (ICMD)
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(Gola and Spadafora 2009: 50–1). The ICMD, in turn, was itself created in
2001 to strengthen ‘the Fund’s conceptual work related to the international
financial system and to capital market’.15
Along with the analytical framework, the instruments, and the organi-
zational resources needed to carry out financial surveillance with a systemic
perspective, the policy changes adopted before the burst of the 2007–09
crisis also helped shape the political support around the reorientation of the
Fund surveillance towards a systemic approach. The Decision on bilateral
surveillance adopted by the Executive Board in June 2007 is illustrative in
this regard. Indeed, as already anticipated, under Article IV, members are
not required to change their domestic policies in circumstances where,
despite the fact that these policies may have negative externalities, they do
not undermine the member’s own domestic stability. In contrast, the 2007
Decision introduced the standard of ‘external stability’ to assess members’
domestic policies (IMF 2007). In other words, although the 2007 Decision
was primarily directed at assessing the external consequences of domestic
exchange rate policies, its adoption suggests that, well before the global
financial crisis burst, member countries have already converged around the
view that member countries’ policies should be assessed not only from the
perspective of one-country stability but also of systemic stability.
3.2 Lagged learning and the global financial crisis
The changes to IMF surveillance analyzed thus far significantly shaped
the Fund’s response to the global financial crisis that started in 2007.
Indeed, previously adopted changes provided the building blocks upon
which the shift to a systemic approach to IMF surveillance materialized.
Specifically, IMF staff members used the effects of previous policy changes
to advance their proposal on systemic supervision and to forge member
countries’ consensus around such a proposal. The documents prepared as
background material to the IMF Board’s discussion well illustrate this
point. Indeed, in most of the documents that served as a basis for the
Board’s decisions, IMF staff members pointed at the existence of available
knowledge, instruments, expertise, and political support in order to intro-
duce the systemic approach to the Fund’s financial supervision. In this
connection, IMF staff motivated the adoption of a systemic approach by
referring to the analytical and organizational resources available to the
Fund through instruments such as the FSAP and Global Financial Stability
Report. Furthermore, in order to advance their proposal, IMF staff also
explicitly linked the shift to systemic surveillance with the 2007 Decision,
thereby catalyzing on existing political support.
For instance, in the background paper to the Board’s 2008 review of
surveillance (IMF 2008a), IMF staff members suggested a number of policy
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recommendations through which to enhance the systemic focus of IMF
surveillance, and which formed the basis of the already mentioned State-
ment on Surveillance Priorities (SSP) adopted by the Board in the fall of
2008. Among others, IMF staff suggested ‘developing a framework for more
systematic macro-financial surveillance y; further building financial
expertise y; and continuing to develop methodologies and toolkits’ (IMF
2008a: 4, emphasis is mine). Interestingly, as the language emphasized in
the quotation reveals, IMF staff considered the recommended actions as
being already part of the Fund’s policy toolkit. That is to say, the Fund had
not to develop a framework for systemic surveillance or create expertise and
resources from scratch, but have to continue improving and expanding on
existing frameworks, expertise, and resources. Commenting their recom-
mended policy actions, IMF staff therefore concluded that in order to
reform IMF surveillance, including by giving it a systemic focus, ‘may
simply require better aligning processes and resources and ‘‘just doing it,’’
because the expertise, the tools and, the data are already there’ (IMF
2008a: 11). In this connection, the staff called on to improve the already
available FSAP by integrating its findings with those conducted within the
framework of the traditional IMF macroeconomic surveillance (IMF
2009c). Furthermore, progress on shifting IMF surveillance towards a sys-
temic approach could be achieved through better leveraging the analytical
findings of existing analyses, in particular, the analysis of the global
financial system conducted in the Global Financial Stability Report. In
short, IMF staff members identified a number of ‘good practices’, already
available within the Fund as the result of previous rounds of reform,
needing to be mainstreamed into the Fund’s systemic surveillance.
Preparing the background documents to the IMF Board’s discussion,
IMF staff also extensively referred to the political support to IMF’s sur-
veillance as developed from the reform embodied in the 2007 Decision.
Indeed, the 2008 Triennial Surveillance Review repeatedly emphasizes
how, as a result of previous changes to IMF surveillance, including the
changes introduced by the 2007 Decision, today’s IMF surveillance is held
in high regard both among its members and other stakeholders, such as
market participants. To capitalize on the results achieved thus far, IMF
staff therefore suggested shifting to a systemic approach by proceeding
along the path set by the 2007 Decision. That is to say, the shift in the
approach to financial sector surveillance should take place by clearly
encompassing ‘assessments of external stability risks’ in the surveillance of
domestic policies and the exchange rate policy in particular (IMF 2008a).
Having shown that the Fund possesses the instruments and the resources
for conducting systemic surveillance, IMF staff facilitated agreement among
member countries. Indeed, the IMF Board quickly adopted the surveillance
priorities suggested by IMF staff in the Triennial Surveillance Review and
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endorsed most of the recommended initiatives, including the launch of
systemic surveillance reports (IMF 2009b). Indeed, as the summary of the
discussion held within the Board reveals, most Directors regarded the staff’s
proposals to reform IMF surveillance as being in line with the conceptual
and operational capacity available within the Fund. In this connection,
Directors agreed that giving financial sector surveillance a systemic focus
requires further developing existing capacity for financial sector analysis
and improving existing instruments such as the Financial Sector Assessment
Programs (FSAPs).16 In other words, Directors agreed on expanding on the
results of previous reforms. Furthermore, members’ preferences for reforming
IMF surveillance were also shaped by the evolution of IMF surveillance
that led to the 2007 Decision. Indeed, it would be difficult in 2008 to
imagine members’ support for proceeding ‘expeditiously’ on issues related
to the shift to external stability as the standard to assess domestic policies,
if the 2007 Decision had not helped accept the principle that effective IMF
surveillance requires assessing domestic policies also in light of their
international implications.17
In short, the strategic use of the effect of past policy solutions by IMF staff
allowed for the quick and profound transformation of IMF surveillance in
2008–09. Past policies structured the options available to the Fund because
they revealed that the Fund possessed the in-house knowledge, expertise,
instruments, and support for moving to a new type of surveillance. Absent
these conditions, a complex change such as the one toward systemic super-
vision could not have happened so rapidly as it did. In particular, none of the
demanding technical and political pre-conditions for the conduct of systemic
supervision could have been rapidly put in place in the short-time span that
separated the burst of the crisis and the reform of the Fund surveillance.
Rather, these conditions were already available, being the result of the slow
and incremental changes adopted since the mid-1990s.
Conclusions
The shift to a systemic approach to financial regulation and supervision is
one of the major developments in response to the 2007–09 financial crisis.
Indeed, domestic and international regulators are converging around the
view that an effective governance of the financial system requires adopting
a macroprudential or systemic outlook, one that takes into account the
safety and soundness of the financial system as a whole, as well as individual
institutions. In this connection, market discipline and self-regulation are no
longer regarded as the only viable mechanism with which to ensure
financial stability (Bernanke 2009, IMF, Bank for International Settlements,
and the Financial Stability Board 2009). This paper has explored such an
emerging change in the approach to global financial governance through
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the prism of the change in IMF surveillance. That is to say, the paper has
asked about the factors that help account for the deep and profound
transformation that led the Fund to take a systemic approach in the con-
duct of its bilateral surveillance. Indeed, member countries quickly reacted
to the crisis by shifting IMF bilateral surveillance from a one-country to a
multilateral or systemic approach. That is to say, the IMF has been asked to
assess member countries’ domestic policies not only in light of their
implications for the domestic economy but also in light of their spill-over
effects on other countries.
Analysing the pattern of transformation in the Fund’s policy, the paper has
argued that, while the crisis was certainly an important catalyst, the causes
that explain the rapid and substantive shift in the scope of IMF surveillance lie
in the cumulative effects of the lessons drawn from the 1990s financial crises
and the attendant policy changes. Specifically, the paper has illustrated that
the Mexican and the Asian crises had already raised the need to reform IMF
surveillance by showcasing the risks of financial sector weaknesses to global
financial stability. Nevertheless, the lessons drawn from the two crises did not
lead to a radical transformation of IMF surveillance. Rather, the macro-
economic expertise of IMF staff and the microprudential preferences of the
advanced countries well-represented in the Executive Board combined to
produce a process of lagged learning that materialized in a pattern of small
and incremental change to IMF surveillance. As a result, new knowledge and
instruments were added to the existing surveillance toolkit and human
resources were redirected to new goals.
Although small and incremental, the implications of the lessons from the
1990s crises should not be underestimated. Indeed, the findings of the paper
indicate that the gradual changes enacted after the Mexican and Asian
experience proved crucial to the transformation of the Fund surveillance in
the aftermath of the 2007–09 crisis. In particular, IMF staff members
capitalised on the effect of previous policy choices in order to introduce the
systemic approach to IMF surveillance. Acting as policy entrepreneurs, the
staff utilized the theoretical and organizational resources developed from
past incremental changes to make the case for the Fund’s ability to act as a
systemic supervisor and to win member countries’ approval.
Having shown that the cumulative effect of previous policy changes
created the conditions for a quick and radical transformation of IMF
surveillance, the paper stresses the importance of temporality and process
sequencing to explain both gradual and abrupt policy change (Haydu 1998;
Howlett 2009). Unlike most path-dependent analyses, this paper found
evidence that there the 2007–09 crisis cannot be considered as a random
turning point that sets in motion the process of change. Rather, the crisis
interacted with the effects of previous policy changes. The impact of the
crisis on the IMF policy was therefore filtered through the outcome of past
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policy choices. In this connection, policy change appears as firmly rooted
in previous trajectories with the result that, ‘gradually unfolding changes
may be hugely consequential as causes of other outcomes’ (Mahoney and
Thelen 2010: 1).
The paper has also attempted to expand the research agenda of policy
studies by analyzing a policy of an international organization. Although this
attempt may feed into the problem of the dependent variable, by adding to the
complexity of the explanandum (i.e. policy change) (Capano 2009; Howlett and
Cashore 2009), the reasons to leave the activities of IOs outside the purview of
policy studies are not substantive. Indeed, most international organizations
take actions to solve societal problems similarly to what is expected from public
policies. In terms of the policy-making process, then, like any public policy, the
policies adopted by several IOs take place in the presence of multiple con-
straints, including time and resource constraints during financial crises for
instance. The different stages of the policy-making process of most IOs are also
defined ex ante in their constitutional charters and involve a variety of actors
with the task of drafting, adopting and implementing policies. Of course, IOs
differ in terms of the characteristics of the policy-making systems; but this opens
up the possibility for comparative analyses, thereby making IOs an appealing
field to policy scholars.
NOTES
1. For instance, this is the purpose of the 2003 Basel II banking accord. Specifically, Basel II capital
requirements are meant to contain the risks each bank faces in the domestic financial system as a
result of its lending and trading practices.
2. For an analysis of the factors that make changes to IMF’s policies slow and difficult to be adopted see,
for instance, Vetterlein (2006).
3. As the IEO (2001, 6 emphasis is mine) summarizes it, in the run-up to the crisis, ‘the IMF appropriately
stressed the urgency of addressing the persistent and growing current account imbalances, but it did
not look at how these imbalances were linked to the systemic risks that were building up in financial systems.’
4. The characteristics and the actors involved in Fund’s policy-making process are detailed below.
5. The Board exercises all the powers for conducting the IMF’s business except those that the Articles of
Agreement have reserved for the Board of Governors, which is the supreme organ of the IMF. The
Board of Governors consists of one representative for each member country and, in contrast to the
Executive Bard, meets normally twice a year. For a thorough analysis of IMF governance see Van
Houtven 2002.
6. To remedy this problem, the IMF has recently embarked on a extensive reform of its governance.
IMF website http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm#a1.
7. The Chairman is usually the Managing Director or his/her Deputy.
8. IMF website, Surveillance, http://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm (accessed 17 March 2009).
9. The literature on the Asian crisis is extensive and references are simply indicative here. For detailed
analyses of the Asian crisis from an economics perspective: Krugman 1995; and Goldstein 1998. For
accounts of the crisis from a political economy perspective: Haggard 2000; Noble and Ravenhill
2000; Moschella 2010.
10. On the implications of the financial sector weaknesses for the reform of the international financial
architecture see, for instance, Walter (2008).
11. For instance, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, developed countries supported the international
financial standard initiative to improve global financial surveillance (Drezner 2007; Walter 2008). The
initiative was staked on the assumption that financial stability would be preserved to the extent that
emerging and developing countries would have embraced the financial supervisory and regulatory
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frameworks of the most advanced financial centers – which, ironically, were exactly the countries were
the global financial crisis burst in 2007.
12. However, the most important advances in the development of a systemic approach to financial
regulation and supervision have been done within the Bank for International Settlements. See, for
instance, Borio et al. 2001; and Borio and White 2004.
13. IMF website, About the Global Financial Stability Report, Available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/about.htm (accessed 26 March 2010).
14. Area departments are responsible, across macro-geographical regions, for Article IV consultations. In
contrast functional departments are those most involved in the Fund’s research work including, for
instance, the Research Department.
15. IMF, Establishing International Capital Markets Department, News Brief N8 01/24, 1 March 2001. In 2006,
ICM was merged with MFD creating the Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
16. IMF, IMF Executive Board Reviews the Fund’s Surveillance, Public Information Notice (PIN)
No. 08/133 11 October 2008. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2008/
pn08133.htm (accessed 23 September 2010).
17. Ibid.
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